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A COBBLER'S COURT, A PRACTITIONER'S

COURT: THE REHNQUIST COURT FINDS ITS
"GROOVE"9*
Larry Catat Backert

I. INTRODUCTION

Commentators have reviewed the 1997-98 Supreme Court Term and judged it
a great yawn, a Term of "relative quiescence."' There was a sense of emptiness at
the end of the Term.
[Flundamental questions of liberty and equality were almost invisible. Even
matters of federalism, so prominent in recent Terms, receded from view. Instead,
the docket was crammed with technical questions of "lawyer's law." Such issues
are an essential ingredient of every Term's caseload, but this year they were
especially dominant, as the Court turned its attention to filling relatively small
gaps in acts of Congress and the Court's own precedents.2
The general opinion among the press, relying on their stables of law professor
pundits, have declared the session to be uninteresting, at least from the perspective
of the development of grand theory.' And indeed, the 1997-98 Supreme Court Term
may well appear insubstantial from an operatic perspective: there were no battles of
grand theory, no orchestras playing contests of good versus evil for heavenly
spectators, no great chorus of people screaming for this or that thing to be done in the
name of one or more of the currently fashionable deities.

*

Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner'sGuide to the October 1997 Term ofthe United

States Supreme Court,at the University of Tulsa College of Law, December 11, 1998. In order to keep as close to the
original flavor of the remarks, the text has been edited sparingly and a few footnotes have been added.
t Executive Director, Tulsa Comparative & International Law Center, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa
College of Law.
1. Michael C. Dorf,Foreword: The Limits of SocraticDeliberation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 4,5 (1998) (citations

omitted).
2. Id.

3. The pronouncement in a recent Oregon State Bar Bulletin piece nicely summarized this view: "In some
quarters, the Supreme Court's 1997 term has been dubbed the Seinfeld term; it offered a lot of interesting observations
but in the end it wasn't about anything at all." Jeff Bleich, Kelly Klaus, Elizabeth Earle Beske, A Term About
Something: Though Not Fullof Sound and Fury, the Term Definitely Signified Something, 58 Aug/Sep OR. ST.B.

Buu. 19 (1998).

347

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 8

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34.347

A closer view, however, reveals the shallowness of this judgment in at least two
respects. The first has been well understood, especially by practitioners. These folk
are pleased with the form of many of the decisions of the 1997-98 Term, especially
in the areas of sexual harassment and criminal law, for the guidance the opinions have
provided those who must administer or enforce the law, or otherwise conform their
behavior to emerging legislative and judicial impositions.4 My second, and much less
generally recognized, reason for judging the past Term significant is far less concrete,
but important nonetheless. The past Term has fully exposed what the Rehnquist
Court is about. The Court has at last revealed (and reveled in) its identity, its
equilibrium, and perhaps its mission. This past Term uncovers a Court most
productive and at its best (whatever one may think of the results in particular cases)
when it eschews grand theory and instructs in the everyday application of the myriad
of mundane obligations imposed upon people by court and legislature. This is a
practitioner's court, a cobbler's court-and many should be happy for it.
The coming years will show that the Rehnquist Court has finally found its
"groove. '" It is a Cobbler's Court. I will briefly discuss this past Term's federalism
cases to illustrate the way in which this Cobbler's Court works, that is, how it
approaches cases and fashions decisions. I believe these decisions evidence the way
the Rehnquist Court has successfully adopted an incrementalist, highly focused
approach to decision making.6 Moreover, recent Rehnquist Court cases also suggest
what will be seen as the hallmark of this Court-the foremost purpose of decisions
is to provide practicalguidance to people, and especially administrators, enforcers
and those bound by particular provisions, in the application of obligations and duties
imposed by courts and legislators. I will then describe how the methodology of
decision making illustrated in these cases reveals the Rehnquist Court as a grand
Cobbler's Court. This is a Court at its best producing something of use to those who
must administer the law. The days of high theory, the days of a Supreme Court
masquerading as a Pontifical Court, are over-at least for the moment!
II. THE FEDERALISM CASES
The federalism cases this past Term which I review here were neither
momentous, nor at the heart of the cultural or socio-political struggles of American

4. See, e.g., Lisa A Regini, Supreme Court Cases: 1997-1998 Term, 67 FBI L. ENFORCEMETBULL. 25 (Oct.
1, 1998), availablein 1998 WL 15028970.

5. See How SriAGorHRGRoovEBACK (Twentieth Century Fox 1998). Like the attitude shown by the title
character, the Court's opinions have reeked of boredom, exhaustion, and lack of passion. Its boredom has been
especially evident in the interminable battles over increasingly irrelevant theoretical stances. Its passion could have been
aroused only when it attempted to move away from the fixation on those stances. At last, as acobbler'scourt, Rehnquist
and his colleagues have found their groove.
6. Jesse Choper made asimilar point with respect to decisions of the 1996 Term, though such ajudgment, inhis
opinion, might not be a cause for great rejoicing. See Jesse H. Choper, On The Difference in ImportanceBetween
Supreme CourtDoctrine And Actual Consequences: A Review of The Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19
CARo7O L. REV. 2259 (1998).

7. AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1956 (1998); Baker v. General Motors, 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998);
Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464 (1997); Breard v.Virginia, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
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generations since the end of the Second World War. That battle has shifted, as it
should, to the political realm. In the battle over the impeachment and removal of
President Clinton, the Supreme Court has thankfully played a marginal role.8 Each
of the cases, interesting in their own right, serves as an excellent example of the
jurisprudence at which the Rehnquist Court excels. Each is narrowly tailored to a
specific situation, aimed at the practitioner, not the theoretician.9 Each is meant to
provide guidance to those who must live within the constraints of the law applied, and
each is of little use outside the class of situations immediately presented.
A. AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc. 1°
AT&T is a classic preemption case, made more interesting because the federal
legislation at issue was deemed to substantially foreclose action on state-based
claims. While this result might have been ordinary even ten years ago, the Rehnquist

Court has been endowed with a reputation for being significantly deferential to states
and extraordinarily nondeferential to the federal government with respect to
legislation such as the Brady Bill" and the Firearms Bill.' 2 The fact that this Court,
far more sensitive to state prerogatives, issued an opinion creating a broad area of
federal preemption, perhaps even gratuitously broad, ought to make us stop long
enough to see what was going on here.
In this case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the filed-rate doctrine 3

applies to non-price features in utility tariffs, such as service conditions and billing
options, as well as rates. The Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision.' 4 It

ruled that the Communications Act of 1934 preempted a suit filed by a telephone
reseller alleging that AT&T had breached promises to offer certain services, where
AT&T's tariff already had addressed availability of such services.
The lawsuit was filed by Central Office Telephone, Inc. (COT), a reseller of

8. The Court's involvement in the Presidential cases, at once fascinating and misguided, is beyond the scope of
this address. For a discussion of those cases from a different perspective, see Martin H. Belsky, Investigating the
President: The Supreme Court and the Impeachment Process, 34 TULSA LJ. 289 (1999).
9. And in this way, perhaps, the Rehnquist Court has become as dismissive of the theoretician, and the legal
academic, as the theoretician has been of the Court in the recent past.
10. 118 S. Ct. 1956 (1998).
11. Brady Handgun Prevention Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
12. Owner's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections and titles of U.S.C.).
13. Under the filed rate doctrine:
the rate of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted upon
any pretext. Shippers and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier
must abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or
misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed.
This rule is undeniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies
the policy which has bene adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order
to prevent unjust discrimination.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94,97 (1915), quoted in AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc.,
118 S. Ct. 1956, 1962-63 (1998).
14. Central Office Tel., Inc. v. AT&T, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997).
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long distance capacity on AT&T's network under an AT&T program known as
"Software Defined Network" or "SDN." AT&T had filed a tariff detailing its
responsibilities in fulfilling orders and billing for the program. The SDN was
designed to give deep discounts to large customers who Were heavy users of long
distance services. The program also became attractive to resellers such as COT, who
purchased blocks of time at the discount rates and resold them, at a profit, to smaller
customers who could not individually qualify for participation in SDN. In its suit,
COT claimed breach of AT&T's oral contract for more favorable terms than the
tariff required. COT also claimed that AT&T tortiously interfered with COT's
relations with its customers. A federal jury agreed, rendering a verdict in COT's
favor for $13 5 million, which the trial judge reduced to $1,154,000 after post-trial
proceedings. '
A divided Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals panel affirmed.' 6 It
rejected AT&T's argument that the suit should have been barred by the filed-rate
doctrine. The filed-rate doctrine prohibits a carrier from deviating from the terms and
rates set forth in its filed tariff, and bars suits challenging the terms of a tariff that has
been approved. AT&T's petition for a writ of certiorariwas granted.'
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that COT's contract
claim was barred by the filed-rate doctrine, and that the tortious interference claim
was wholly derived from the contract claim "Regardless of the carrier's motive-whether it seeks to benefit or harm a particular customer-the policy of
nondiscriminatory rates is violated when similarly situated customers pay different
rates for the same services."'" Justice Scalia rejected COT's argument that the filedrate doctrine was inapplicable because the same special services it sought were
provided by AT&T to other customers without charge. "To the extent petitioner is
claiming that its own claims for special services are not really special because other
companies get the same preferences, 'that would only tend to show that the practice
was unlawful [with regard to] the others as well.'""9 Lastly, Justice Scalia concluded
that COT's tortious interference claim also was preempted, because it was wholly
derivative of the contract claim for additional and better services.2"
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, in which he
sought to take a less expansive view of the reach of the filed-rate doctrine. He
emphasized that the filed-rate doctrine neither governs the entirety of the relationship
between the customer and the carrier, nor shields the carrier from all state law
liability. "For example, it does not affect whatever duties state law might impose on

15. See id. at 986.
16. See id. at 994.
17. In its certiorari petition, AT&T contended the decision conflicts with past Supreme Court decisions, and would
destroy the majorgoal ofthe Communications Act of 1934- national uniformity. "Indeed, by enforcing the 'side deals'
COT alleges in this case, the court of appeals has made COT the beneficiary of the very discrimination that Sections
202 and 203 [of the Communications Act] and the filed tariff doctrine were intended to prohibit,' AT&T maintained."
I No. 5 ANDREWS TELECOMM. INDUS. LrnG. REP. 6 (1998), availablein 1 No. 5 ANTINDLR 6 (Westlaw).
18. AT&T, 118S. Ct. at 1963.

19. Id. at 1959 (citing United States v. Wabash R.R. Co., 321 U.S. 403, 413 (1944)).
20. See id. at 1964-65.
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petitioner to refrain from intentionally interfering with respondent's relationships with
its customers by means other than failing to honor unenforceable side agreements, or
to refrain from engaging in slander or libel, or to satisfy other contractual obligations." ' However, he agreed that COT's tortious interference claim was wholly
derived from the contract claim.
The dissent was interesting, if only for its limitations. Justice John Paul Stevens
argued that the high court should have remanded at least some of COT's tortious
interference claims for a new trial, because these claims fell outside the reach of the
filed tariff doctrine. "In my opinion, however, the jury's verdict on respondent's tort
claim is supported by evidence that went well beyond, and differed in nature from, the
contract claim." 2 He expressed the view that while the "Court correctly states that
the filed rate doctrine will pre-empt some tort claims;. ... We have never before
applied that harsh doctrine to bar relief for tortious conduct with so little connection
'
to, or effect upon, the relationship governed by the tariff."23
Here the Court took the preemption doctrine, which it had previously construed
narrowly, and applied it in a way reminiscent of the ERISA24 era when the Court read
preemption very broadly.' A closer examination of the case suggests that while the
Court might have been using the language of preemption, it was actually speaking to
another issue entirely. AT&T may be more important as a lesson in the construction
of the relatedness of causes of action, than of the broadness with which preemption
will be applied. In a real sense this case may speak more to the issue of "same
transaction or occurrence" for purposes of claim preclusion, compulsory counterclaims and joinder of claims than to the issue of preemption. Here the guidance is
real and very practical-what constitutes "connectedness" sufficient to have legal
effect. It is hard to conceive of a greater jurisprudence of the case than this.
26
B. Baker v. General Motors Corp.

This case deals with the issue of state-to-state federalism in the context of full
faith and credit. In Baker, a Michigan court entered a stipulated injunction that
barred a former employee of General Motors (GM) from testifying against GM in
other product liability cases. Plaintiffs in a Missouri product liability action against
GM subpoenaed Baker's testimony. GM sought to bar the testimony on the basis of
the Michigan injunction.27 While noting that the settlement agreement and injunction
could prevent the settling employee from volunteering his testimony, the Supreme
Court held that they could neither bind non-parties to the Michigan proceeding nor

21. Id. at 1966 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).

22. Id. at 1967 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 1968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1114 (West 1998).
See, e.g., California Div. of LaborStandards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
118 S. CL657 (1998).

27. See id.at 660-63.
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dictate the admissibility of the testimony to another court.2 8 Thus, the Missouri court
could compel the employee to testify without violating the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
The most important pronouncement of the Court was that there was no general
public policy exception to the obligations of courts under the federal Full Faith and
Credit Clause. There does not exist, as a constitutional matter, any sort of "roving
public policy exception to the full faith and credit due judgements"29 The Court used
Baker to interdict the practice, common in some circuits, of using "public policy" as
the means of refusing to enforce judgments from other states. Lawyers in the
Missouri courts could not argue against enforcement of the Michigan decree on the
basis of the public policy of Missouri as might be divined by the federal courts.
But equally important was the Court's reminder that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause provides no blanket command for approaching judicial decisions of sister
states. The Supreme Court cautioned that "[flull faith and credit... does not mean
that States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and
mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the
sister State judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the
even-handed control of forum law." 30 The Court noted that "[o]rders commanding
action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported
to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province of that other State or
interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority."3'
As such, the Full Faith and Credit Clause must be read in the context of the
limitations of judgments generally, on the one hand, and the power of state courts of
litigants outside its territorial jurisdiction, on the other. Judgments bind only the
parties to the litigation producing the judgment. Moreover, even equitable decrees of
a court can bind only those people and things over which a court has power. In this
case, the law of the Michigan case did not bind the plaintiffs in the Missouri case.
They were strangers to that other litigation. Moreover, Michigan neither had power
over the litigants in the Missouri case nor over the Missouri court. The latter remains
free, within the sovereign state of Missouri, to determine what testimony it would
admit as evidence and whom it would compel to testify in litigation before it. The
Court reasoned instead that Michigan lacked the "authority to control courts
elsewhere by precluding them in actions brought by strangers to the Michigan
litigation from determining for themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and
32
what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth.,

28. See id. at 665-66.
29. Id. at 664.
30. Id. at 665.
31. Id.at 659.
32. Baker v. General Motors, 118 S. Ct. at 666. At oral argument, "Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg picked up on
another consideration, suggesting that 'what you were talking about is one state's right to dictate the rules of
admissibility of evidence in another state, and [that] the Full Faith and Credit [Clause] is about relations... between
the states in the national union more than it is about personal rights ofindividuals."' Jeffrey Robert White, Experts and
Judges,34TRtAL91,92 (Sept. 1998) (Transcriptoforal argument, 1997 WL 638425, at *6, Baker v. General Motors,
118 S. Ct. 657 (1998)).
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The question now becomes-what sort of judgments will be granted full faith
and credit. Of course money judgments will be enforced. What about injunctions?
Rather than devote a tremendous amount of paper to sweeping theoretical observations, the Court went out of its way to provide practical guidance in the context of the
problem facing the litigants. The Court suggested a fact-based test with the sort of
ad hoc balancing for which it has come to be noted in other areas, for example, the
First Amendment.33 Enforcement of injunctions will depend on the facts and
circumstances of the matter before a court, but every court will have to consider
certain factors. Enforcement will depend on the identity of both the parties seeking
enforcement and the parties against whom the enforcement is sought.
While the Michigan decree is enforceable against Elwell, the lack of connection
of the Bakers to the original litigation militates against application of the decree to
them. Also to be considered is the power of the issuing court. Michigan courts have
authority within Michigan, but Michigan courts have no basis for asserting power
over the courts of sister states. Enforcement also depends on the nature of the
judgment. Judgments for things certain-money, for example-leave little room for
error in application. Injunctions are another matter. They are subject to interpretation as well as to modification. This weighs against application of injunctions against
the process of a court of a sister state.
"It is important to examine the three separate opinions in detail because the
rationale for the Baker decision, as articulated by the majority and disputed by the
concurrence, is the only recent direction by the Supreme Court on the issue of full
faith and credit to equitable decrees. 34 The concurrences would not have reached the
constitutional issues. The concurrence in Baker recognized the existence and
enforceability of the injunction and the settlement agreement arising out of a contract
of employment. The boundaries of that injunction and settlement agreement are a
matter of state law, and in this case, Michigan law proved adequate to decide the
case. 35 Under Michigan law, a person subject to agreements like the one involved
could testify in other cases were he ordered to do so by another court.36 Justice Scalia
argued that enforcement measures, like injunctions, do not travel with sister state
judgments as do preclusive effects.37
The primary beneficiaries of the ruling are tort plaintiffs. Had General Motors
been able to enforce its Michigan equitable decree throughout of the nation, plaintiffs
would have been hard-pressed to produce the sort of damaging expert testimony vital
to winning largejury verdicts. Moreover, such a result would have encouraged other
companies to enter in agreements similar to that between General Motors and Elwell.

33. See, e.g., Larry Catd Backer, The IncarnateWord, That Old Rugged (Klan) Crossand the State: On the
Supreme Court's October 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Absurdity as
Jurisprudence,31 TuLSA U. 447 (1996).
34. Polly J.Price, Full Faith And CreditAnd The Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REv. 747, 764 (1998).
35. See Baker, 118 S.Ct. at 668,670-71.
36. See id. at 673.
37. See id. at 668.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 8

354

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:347

As one commentator has noted:
The ruling's immediate impact is very clear. Corporations may not use gag orders
from one state to block whistleblowers from being called to testify in other states.
Had the Court ruled for GM, other companies surely would have followed suit by
forcing disgruntled workers to sign nondisclosure agreements in exchange for
severance pay. "The Court has told GM and other companies they're just not
going to be able to buy the silence of people who have evidence in important
cases," says Jeffrey White of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Public
Citizen, the Ralph Nader organization, hails the GM ruling as a "landmark for
consumers." Companies "can no longer gag its whistleblowers or smother their
revelations," the group says."
These are indeed happy days for the plaintiff's bar. In a world in which
Americans are becoming accustomed to telling any one who will listen everything
they know about anything, the practical effect of Baker will be a far more lively tort
practice across state lines.
The case has proven troublesome to some commentators.39 On the other hand,
Baker may well suggest some of the thinking of the Court should it confront the
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.' Some commentators have argued
that the rejection of any public policy exception for applying the Full Faith and Credit
Clause might make it harder for states to avoid recognizing same sex marriages made
legal in other states. It may also void the provisions of federal law with respect to the
recognition of such unions. 4 Yet, it is not clear that one can wring such lofty theory
from out of the Baker case. This is not that kind of opinion.
While the justices have not ruled squarely on the question of whether
marriages are entitled to full faith and credit, Bakercheers Evan Wolfson,
director of the marriage project for the Lambda Legal Defense Fund in

38. DavidG. Savage, Willa CarCrashRulingLeadtoRecognition ofGayMarriage?,84MAR.A.B.A.42,4344 (1998); seealsoJulieBrienza, CourtMakes It HarderforCorporationsto Silence Whistleblowers,34MAR.TRiAL

17 (1998).
39. See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Full FaithAnd CreditAnd The Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747 (1998) ("The
Court reached the correct result in the case before it, but the basic problems of "equity conflict" remain unresolved.
Both the Court's opinion and the two concurrences were unsatisfactory because the Court failed to address the key

underlying issue of whether or to what extent courts may rely on state law to enjoin extraterritorial conduct. Had the
Court focused on this issue, I argue, it could have based its decision upon a more appealing rationale." Id. at 749). But
see Earl M. Maltz, The Full Faith and CreditClause and the FirstRestatement: The Place Of Baker v. General
Motors Corp. In Choice of Law Theory, 73 TuL L. Ray. 305 (1998) (arguing that the majority opinion in Baker
conforms to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws and suggesting that the Restatement sets forth a plausible approach
to choice of law problems). See generally, Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentialityin the Pursuitof Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999).
40. For general commentary on the Defense of Marriage Act and its Full Faith and Credit Clause Implications, see,
e.g.,Joseph W. Hovermill,A Conflict ofLawsandMorals: The Choice ofLawlmplicationsofHawaii'sRecognition
of Same-Sex Marriages,53 MD. L.REv. 450 (1994); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,Conflict ofLaws, and the
UnconstitutionalPublicPolicy Exception, 106 YA.ELJ. 1965 (1997).
41. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Will a Car Crash Ruling Lead to Recognition of Gay Marriage?, 84 Mar.
A.B.AJ. 42 (1998).
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New York. "This augurs well for us," he says. "The Court makes clear
we live in one country, not 50 separate kingdoms, and if marriage is akin
to a judgment, it gets full faith and credit across the country." But
Edward Hartnett, a professor of civil procedure and constitutional law at
Seton Hall's law school in Newark, N.J., says Wolfson's optimism may
be misplaced. In Hartnett's view, Ginsburg's opinion "studiously avoids
making any comment that affects one way or another the constitutionality
of the Defense of Marriage Act."'4
I suspect that Baker will prove to be of little help should the Court ever review the
validity of the Defense of Marriage Act. Baker can be distinguished on its facts
alone. As to the availability of Baker to prevent states from recognizing same sex
marriages, the answer is a little different, but no more comforting. Baker can be used
as a means of framing the question. However, Baker does not imply how the Court
will weigh the factors other than that it will not weigh competing public policies, and
to that extent, perhaps the case provides the advocates of same-sex marriage a little
victory. A Cobbler's Court does not give that game away before its time.
C. Foster v. Love43
As one commentator has noted, citing Woodrow Wilson, the state-federal
balance of power cannot "be settled by the opinion of any one generation, because it
is a question of growth and every successive stage of our political and economic
development gives it a new aspect and makes it a new question." 44 Foster,perhaps,
proves the point.
In Foster, the Court held that Louisiana's "open primary" statute violated
federal law. The Elections Clause of the Constitution 45 invests the States with
responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but grants Congress "the
power to override state regulations" by establishing uniform rules for federal
elections. 46 Congress has passed legislation setting the date of the biennial election
for places in the Senate and House of Representatives. Congress also mandates
holding all congressional and presidential elections on a single November day.4
Since 1978, Louisiana has held in October of a federal election year an "open
primary" for congressional offices, in which all candidates, regardless of party,
appear on the same ballot and all voters are entitled to vote. A candidate receiving
a majority of votes at the open primary "is elected" and does not have to stand for

42. Id. at 44.
43. 118 S. Ct.464 (1997).
44. Donald C. Wintersheimer, RelationshipBetween Federaland State ConstitutionalLaw, 25 N. KY. L. REv.
257, 277 (1998) (quoting, in part, WOODROW WILSON, CONSTIIONALGOVERNMENTIN THE UNTED STATES 173

(1908)).
45.
46.
47.
48.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,832-833 (1995).
2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (1994).
See2U.S.C.§§ 1,7(1994);3U.S.C.§ 1(1994).
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election on federal election day. Louisiana voters challenged this primary as a
violation of federal law. Finding no conflict between the state and federal statutes,
the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the state's Governor and
Secretary of State. The Fifth Circuit reversed.
The Court relied on the Elections Clause of the Constitution and concluded that
Congress "has the power to override state regulations" by establishing uniform rules
for federal elections, binding on the States. Thus, Congress has legislated that all
federal elections be held on a single day throughout the country. The purpose of this
legislation was to protect the integrity of the federal election process. On that basis,
federal law affecting federal office could preempt any state law which interfered with
the authority of the federal government to protect the order and manner in which those
who seek its offices are elected.49 As such, in striking down the Louisiana statute as
conflicting with federal law, the Court noted an important policy behind a single
federal election day: to prevent early elections in one state from influencing later
elections in another state. This latter point, of course, is actually the most interesting
aspect of this case. The problem of broadcasting election results early has become
increasingly troublesome in the second half of the twentieth century. Louisiana's
provision was merely a formalized and extreme form of the problem. More perverse,
perhaps, is the effect of broadcast and electronic journalism on national elections.
The Court means to preserve the vitality of the two party system in the United States.
Why else worry about the effect of broadcasting election results in New York before
the polls have closed in California? This Court has shown itself to be very interested
in the preservation of the basis of our two party republican form of government.5 0
D. Breard v. Greene5 '
This is a case which will have repercussions in a number of areas, yet the Court
was careful to focus the case as narrowly as possible. Here the Court demonstrates
a significant deference to the dignity of American states within the system of
international law. Late twentieth century Americans, accustomed to the centralizing
tendencies so successfully pursued since the beginning of the century may find the
opinion curious and perhaps mildly disturbing. The opinion puts people on notice
that the American Republic remains a federation, and perhaps a federation which is
different in less substantial degree from its cousin, the European Union.
Let's start with the facts of the case, which are a bit complex. Breard, a citizen
of Paraguay residing in the United States, was arrested in Virginia and charged with
attempted rape and capital murder. Following a 1993 jury trial, he was convicted of

49. Social scientists have found that the way primaries are ordered may affect the nature ofcandidates elected. See,
e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber and Rebecca B. Morton, PrimaryElection Systems and Representation, 14 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 304 (1998).
50. See generally, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer, VMl and the Art of Divining Equal
Protection,32 TULSA W. 361 (1997).
51. 118S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
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both charges and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the convictions and sentences,52 and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.3 State collateral relief was subsequently denied as well. In 1996, Breard
filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
for federal habeas corpus relief, in which motion the accused argued for the first time
that (1) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 54 conferred on foreign nationals
the right to consular assistance following arrest; and (2) at the time of the accused's
arrest, the arresting authorities had failed to inform him that he had the right, as a
foreign national, to contact his nation's consulate. The District Court, in dismissing
the habeas corpus petition, concluded that the accused (1) had procedurally defaulted
the Vienna Convention claim when he failed to raise the claim in state court, and (2)
could not demonstrate cause and prejudice for this default.5 ' The Fourth Circuit
affirmed.56 In a separate action, the District Court, the Republic of Paraguay,
Paraguay's ambassador to the United States, and Paraguay's consul general to the
United States brought suit against some Virginia officials for the alleged violation of
Paraguay's rights under theVienna Convention. Additionally, the Paraguayan consul
general, alleging a denial of his own rights under the Vienna Convention, asserted a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court dismissed the
action for lack of
58
57
subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In 1998, Paraguay pursued the Vienna Convention claim by instituting
proceedings against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
which issued an order requesting that the United States take measures to insure that
the accused not be executed pending the final decision in the ICJ proceedings.5 9
Paraguay also invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors and consuls, filing a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. At the
same time, the accused filed a petition for habeas corpus as an original matter in the
Supreme Court. Both Breard and Paraguay filed applications for a stay of execution.
The Supreme Court denied the petitions, the stay applications, and the motion
for leave to file a bill of complaint. In a per curiam opinion expressing the views of
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and the Chief Justice, the Court
rejected the argument that the execution violated the Vienna Convention. The per
curiam explained that Breard had procedurally defaulted on his rights under the
Vienna Convention by failing to raise the claim in the state courts.6" On two
grounds, the Supreme Court rejected Paraguay's argument that because the Vienna
Convention was the "supreme law of the land," the procedural default doctrine could

52. 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994).
53. 513 U.S. 971 (1994).
54. 21 U.S.T. 77.

55. See 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996).
56. See 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
57. See 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996).
58. See 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
59. See Breard v. Green, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1354 (1998) ("On April 3, 1998, nearly five years after Breard's
conviction became final, the Republic of Paraguay instituted proceedings against the United States in the International
Court ofJustice (ICJ), alleging that the United States violated the Vienna Convention at the time of Breard's arrest.").
60. See id. at 1355.
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not be invoked. First, the Court explained that the Vienna Convention itself permitted
the United States to invoke the procedural default doctrine.6' The Court also rejected
the claim on the basis of its view that the United States' obligations under the Vienna
Convention have been modified by the subsequently enacted Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).6 2 The opinion went on to conclude that even
if the Vienna Convention claim had been properly raised, the claim would have no
effect, because Breard was unable to show that the violation had an effect on the trial
that ought to have resulted in the overturning of the judgment of conviction. His
claims were of a sort more speculative than those routinely rejected by the courts in
other cases.63
The per curiam then dealt with Paraguay's claims. The Court declared that the
Vienna Convention did not clearly provide a foreign nation with a private right of
action in United States courts. This statement was asserted without reference to case
law or other corroborative source. 4
The per curiam's Eleventh Amendment analysis was both short and confused.
The Court reminded us that "the States, in the absence of consent, are immune from
suits brought against them... By a foreign state."6' This presented the Eleventh
Amendment in its role as repository of some sort of constitutionalization of sovereign
immunity. Then the Court rejected the argument that Young applied. 66 "Though

Paraguay claims that its suit is within an exemption dealing with continuing
61. It argued that the procedural rules of the forum state govern the implementation of a treaty in that state. United
States procedural rules require the assertion of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state courts in habeas
proceedings. "By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, Breard failed to exercise his rights under
the Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Having
failed to do so, he cannot raise a claim of violation of violation of those rights now on federal habeas review." Id. It
argued that the procedural rules of the forum state govem the implementation of a treaty in that state, and because U.S.
procedural rules require the assertion of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state courts in habeas
proceedings
62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254- 66. (Supp. 1998) (referring to Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)). "Breard's ability to
obtain relief based on violations of the Vienna Convention is subject to this subsequently enacted rule,just as any claim
arising under the United States Constitution would be." Breard.118 S. Ct. at 1355 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989)). Because Breard had not raised the issue before the state courts, he would be unable to establish how the
lack of consular advice prejudiced him. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1356.
65. Id. at 1355-56 (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,329-330 (1934)); see also Louis
E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: DamagesAgainst States in Their Own Courtsfor
ConstitutionalViolations,69 Cal. L. Rev. 189 (198 1).
66. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908). The rules, as expressed by that Court, creates an "exception"
to the limitation of suits in federal courts against states for violation of federal law.
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the
State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the
authority of, and one which does not affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity.
It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of
the State, to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act
which the state attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the
officer, in proceeding under such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority ofthat
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to
impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.
Id. Fora nice review of the cases constructing the current understanding of the Eleventh Amendment, see, e.g., Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALELJ. 1683 (1997).
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consequences of past violations of federal rights, we do not agree. The failure to
notify the Paraguayan Consul occurred long ago and has no continuing effect. The
causal link present in Milliken is absent in this case."6 7
The Court then rejected Paraguay's § 1983 claim on the ground that Paraguay
was not a "person" for purposes of the statute and thus was not authorized to bring
suit.68 And finally, though with regret, the Court suggested that ultimately the issue
for Paraguay was political. While Paraguay and the federal government could
attempt to use such diplomatic means as were available to prevail upon the Governor
of Virginia to postpone the execution, the Court could not compel any action on the
part of the Virginia governor.
Justice Souter filed a separate opinion, and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer dissented. The three dissenters stressed their annoyance with Virginia's
determination to speedily execute Mr. Breard. As Justice Breyer explained,
Virginia's execution schedule "leaves less time for argument and for Court
consideration than the Court's rules provide for ordinary cases. Like Justice Stevens,
I can find no special reason here to truncate the period of time that the Court's rules
would otherwise make available." 9 On that basis, the dissenting Justices were
unwilling to concede the substantive points taken for granted in the per curiam.7"
Breard is a fine example of the product of a court unwilling to leap into great
issues, even when they are staring it in the face. Here the Court provides simple
guidance grounded in the traditional notions of treaty application and federal/state
comity. Indeed, the only thing which troubles the justices is the speed with which this
simple decision is made. It offends some of thejustice's supra-constitutional notions
of fairness in constitutional adjudication." The substance of the decision might well
be less troubling even to the dissenters.
Yet, the Court's treatment of the Vienna Convention, while neither new nor
extraordinary, reminds us of the problems the United States will face with increasing
frequency in this era of rapid entanglements in international legal systems. These
entanglements are transforming our traditional two layer system of state and federal
governments bound together by a constitution. In its place, we are blundering into
a three layer federal system composed of state, national and supra-national
governments.72 While the relations between state and national governments are still
governed by a constitution, the between the national government and the supranational entity is governed by any number of agreements we call "treaties" in

67. See Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1357 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. Justice Breyer makes this quite clear in his dissent. See id.
71. For a discussion of the fashioning offairness as a major extra-constitutional principle of constitutional law, see
LarryCatABackerFairnessasaGeneralPrincipleofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw:Applying Extra-Constitutional
Principlesto ConstitutionalCases in Hendricks and M.L.B., 33 TULsA L.J. 135 (1997).
72. Actually, there may be four layers-state, tribal, national and supra-national. The United States hasyet to sort
out its relationship with the Indian tribes, and between the tribes and the states.
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contradistinction to "constitutions." 73 The United States, to varying degrees, is now
subject to any number of conventions, leagues of nations for this or that purpose and
with this or that set of enforcement mechanisms. We have lately limited our
sovereignty to the extent necessary to comply with our obligations under the North
American Free Trade Act7 4 and as a part of the World Trade Organization. We form
a part of the web of relationships arising through the United Nations.
These are the multiple and fluid levels of our emerging federal system. The
coming century will reveal the way in which our eighteenth century federal system
incorporates these twentieth century piecemeal accretions and cessions of sovereignty.
For the moment, our federal legislative and executive branches will continue to
commit the United States to entry into multi-national systems of all descriptions. Our
judicial branch treats these commitments as essentially political-binding only as and
to the extent that Congress so provides by additional legislation. Treaties remain
hortatory devices unless the Congress explicitly tells us otherwise or unless Congress
passes "real" national legislation implementing the "promises" made in the treaty.75
Moreover, such treaty obligations can be modified or abrogated by subsequent
legislation.
Our jurisprudence is very near like that in Britain, which is also trying now to
understand the nature of its new place within the emerging European Union.76 The
United States takes the position that though it cedes sovereignty to an extent when it
becomes a member of international organizations, it only loses that sovereignty as and
to the extent it so specifies, from time to time. Moreover, unlike the states of the
American federal union, the American national government reserves for itself the
right to secede from these international unions at will.
What I find richly amusing about this is that as the national government
becomes more and more a subordinate level of supra-national government, the
rhetoric coming from the judiciary in opinions like Breard begins to sound
suspiciously, deliciously, and ironically like the rhetoric of John C. Calhoun, urged
on the national government a century ago in defense of the sovereign majesty of South
7
Carolina (and other states) to resist the power of government at the national level. "

73. I reject the common understanding of a fundamental difference between treaties and constitutions, the former
being a creature of the "law" between nations and the latter belonging to a different "species" of law. See generally
Larry Catd Backer, ForgingFederalSystems Within a Matrix of ContainedConflict: The Example of the European
Union, HARVARD JEAN MONNEr WORKING PAPER, No. 4/98 (1998) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/
JeanMonnetlpapersf98/98-4-.html> (visited Feb.22, 1999); Prasad Sharma, Restoring Partial Democracy: Why the
U.S. ShouldListento Citizen Voices While Engagingin InternationalEnvironmentaliLawMaking,12 EMoRY INT'L
L.REV. 1215, 1231 (1998).
74. North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3301-3473 (West Supp. 1998).
75. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829) (A treaty is in its nature acontract between two nations, not
a Legislative Act. It does not generally effect, ofitself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation
is intraterritorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument).
76. See Blackbum v. Attrmey General, [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380 (C.A.) (British execution ofEuropean Community
Treaty had no effect in Britain unless implemented by act of Parliament); Macarthys, Ltd. v. Smith, [ 1979] 3 All E.R.
325 (C.A.) (Parliament has authority to abrogate or modify Britain's obligations under the European Community
Treaty).
77. See generallyJo N C. CALHOUN, UNIONANDLIBERTY: TtEPoLMcALPH1LtsoPHYoFJoHN C.CALuN (1811 1850) (Ross M. Lence, ed. 1992).
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This philosophy was discredited (by war) when applied to the relationship between
states and the national government of the United States. It is accepted with little
question in defining the relationship of one "state" to another in the context of multistate unions. However, as these unions begin to take on more of the attributes of
government, the parallels will be hard to dismiss.
III. A COBBLER'S COURT, A PRACTrrIONER'S COURT
My discussion of these cases leads me back to where we started this morning.
More specifically, it leads me back to Judge Holmes' opening remarks on his grateful
assessment of the role this Supreme Court has finally embraced.7" I want to draw on
some lessons raised by the cases I have just considered and attempt to draw some
useful conclusions about the nature of the Supreme Court's approach to the
profession. This exercise will also help us understand why many commentators carry
on about their view that the Rehnquist Court's decisions are so "disappointing."
Stella has indeed got her groove back-the Rehnquist Court is now grooving to the
petitioners' beat. It has fulfilled its promise by embracing its vocation-that of
Cobbler's Court.79 Sadly, for many of us, Rehnquist's Stells is not grooving the way
we want her to.
The Rehnquist Court has become disappointing, and particularly disappointing
this past Term, because the Court has failed to meet our expectations of a Supreme
Court of the American federation. We have gotten very used to the American
Supreme Court acting out scenes from Cecil B. DeMille's movie The Ten Commandments.80 We expect the sturm und drag of the great scenes between Charlton
Heston's Moses and Yul Brenner's Raamses leading to the exodus from Egypt with
the Court playing the role of the supernatural-God or Satan depending on the
listener's point of view. This Court, as supernatural, makes the big pronouncements
in the big cases: thou shaltabort;thou shalt not leadprayerin publicschools; thou
shalt not take the vote from gay people. Such pronouncements send chills up our
collective spines. This is the Court doing God's work-or the Devil's. This is what
we want our court to do. It's like heroin addiction. If we do not get our hit, we
wonder what is wrong; and we have been supplied with this stuff at least since the
days of the Warren Court.8'
This is the Court of grand theory for which we watch, like so many Hollywood
groupies waiting for their starlet of the moment. This is the Court which, as Judge
Holmes noted, provides us with pronouncements of fundamental principles of
constitutional law. 2 These fundamental principles of constitutional law help all of
us, perhaps, to understand how to approach our own reading of the federal

78.
79.
80.
81.
1996).
82.

See Sven Erik Holmes, Introduction: The October 1997 Supreme CourtTerm, 34 TULSA LJ.201 (1999).

My notion of Cobbler's Court is further explored infra notes 87-I04 and accompanying text.
See THrETEN CONMMANDNMBNrS
(Paramount 1956).
For a sense of this sort of addiction, see e.g., THE WARReq CouR A REmROSPEcnVE (Bernard Schwartz, ed.
See Holmes, supranote 78, at 202.
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Constitution. It helps illuminate for us the normative walls within which we are
permitted to interpret our basic law. Law professors, journalists, and politicians all
love grand theory. We cannot get enough. Our engagement with grand theory keeps
us employed. It is sexy, ambiguous, and malleable. It perpetuates the illusion that
some powerful entity (the Court) is engaging in very important work (its opinions),
which will fundamentally transform our social order--or destroy it. Even lawyers
love grand theory. It is ambiguous and malleable, but not in the sense that gives
pleasure to academics. Like sculpting clay, soft and porous, giving way to any touch,
grand theory creates the possibility of endless litigation. Litigation, a the fees it
generates, makes it possible for lawyers to pay the tuition our universities charge to
keep academics comfortably employed. This technology of law is both a closed
system, and the source and fuel of its perpetuation.83 Grand theory is a wonderful
thing.
Yet, much like sermons delivered in our houses of worship, it is sometimes hard
to grasp what is left of grand theory in the dimming afterglow of its delivery. Think
about what happens to the words, those wonderful grand general billowing words and
ideas, delivered with such eloquence, between the time you get into your car and the
time you get home. Can you even reconstruct that which was said by the time you
sit in front of the television? You can remember the general idea, but you have no
idea how this idea ought to apply to the circumstances of your everyday life. Grand
theory can at times provide little guidance to governments, courts, lawyers, or people.
At this point, you come closer to understanding Judge Holmes' tone when he declares
his undying gratitude when the Court actually provides guidance to the inferior
courts.8 4 The implication, of course, is that for years it has not provided that
guidance.
Grand theory is at its best at the most general of levels. It is most useless at the
level of the individual, or at the level of application. It is animated by the love of
humankind, but requires a blindness to individual humans, each uniquely situated.
Justice Scalia is my candidate for poster boy of grand theory. Justice Scalia tends not
to let the individual get in the way of theory. What seems inconsistent-Oncale8 5 on
the one hand and Romer 6on the other-can be explained by his consistent passion
for application of the logic of a theory he has taken great pains to develop. In the
former, the internal consistency of the statute assumed paramount importance, the
individual and his situation was of secondary importance. In the latter case, moral
theory applied to groups of people took center stage. Individuals were of no
consequence in the analysis or for the theory

83. Cf Niklas Luhmann, Law as Social System, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 136 (1988-89) (on law as a self perpetuating

closed system); Pierre Bourdieu, The ForceofLaw: TowardaSociology ofthe JuridicalField,38 HASTINGsLJ. 805
(1987).
84. See Holmes, supra note 78, at 201.
85. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (sex harassment statute covers instances of same
sex harassment).
86. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (Majority voided a Colorado constitutional amendment affecting the
participation of gay people in the political process. Justice Scalia dissented arguing that traditional deference to issues
of sexual morality supported the amendment. See id. at 636.).
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Despite the efforts of Justice Scalia, the Rehnquist Court has increasingly
shown itself inept at grand theory. The titans of grand theory of a generation ago are
now largely absent from the court. Though the Court remains as fragmented as ever,
the fissures are no longer necessarily ideological. Instead, the differences could be
better understood as differences in the sense of what the nature of the Court's work
ought to be. There are a number of justices now who are uncomfortable with grand
theory. It is harder and harder for Justice Scalia to find people to play the game so
popular on the Burger and Warren Courts. As a result, the Rehnquist Court has been
unable to stamp on the public mind, or even the academic mind, its peculiar vision of
a theory of American Constitutional law or even a theory of courts or the American
political system. It has never really made such pronouncements, unlike its
predecessor Courts under Chief Justices Warren and Burger.
With this Term's cases, however, we can begin to clearly see the "groove" of
this Court. This is not a court of grand theory; this is a cobbler's court. What do I
mean by this term? A cobbler's court is in some ways the antithesis of a court of
grand theory. A cobbler's court is a practitioner's court, a pragmatist court.. It is a
court that desires to be fair, 7 is respectful of the past (at least when it suits them),88
and is deferential to its own traditions 9 and past opinions.9' Most importantly, it is
a court which is less comfortable making pronouncements at the level of humankind,
and much more comfortable making law for the individual. This is a court guided by
a mentality which prefers to give guidance to the courts, 9' to fill in the blanks, to
provide regularity and some comfort to those who it must advise, to look at the
practical.
This is a court which prefers to contextualize its decisions. This is a court
which balances the interests of everyone involved in a litigation. Yet, the Rehnquist
cobbler's court creates as much frustration as was created by the grand but empty
theory of prior courts. But the frustration is of a different order. The court's
emphasis on the individuality of cases creates a contextualization nightmare. Where
the facts of a case make all the difference in the world, the value of guidance
diminishes as facts deviate from those adjudicated. After all, no two sets of facts are
exactly alike.
As a result, the nature of the battles within the Rehnquist Court has been of a
substantially different character than the battles fought in the Warren and Burger
Courts. The Warren and Burger Courts spawned huge ideological battles. These

87. See Larry Cats Backer, Fairnessas a GeneralPrincipleofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw: Applying ExtraConstitutionalPrinciplesto ConstitutionalCases in Hendricks and M.L.B., 33 TuLSA LJ. 135 (1997).
88. Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), provides a good example of the way in which the Court attempts
deference to the past.
89. See, e.g., Swidler v. Berlin, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (affirming the broadly applied rule of privilege, though
leaving the door open for reconsideration on the appropriate factual situation).
90. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
91. The sex harassment cases are a good example of this tendency this past Term. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). Another good example is Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998) in which the Court
severely limited the circumstances under which people could recover from police for injuries received as a result of a
high speed chases. This is a court which prefers to contextualize its decisions.
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were battles over grand theory, over a vision of the socio-legal political culture in
which decisions are made. The particular litigants and their causes of action became
marginal characters in the battle of the titans. Lawyers understood the nature of the
battles. The 1960s saw the explosive growth of "strategic" and "impact" litigation
on a willing judiciary.'
In contrast, the Rehnquist Court, especially after the retirement of Justice
Brennan (when the Rehnquist Court perhaps really began), spawned a very different
type of battle. Here we see more often the battle between two very different styles of
appellate judging. This is best personified by the battles between Justice Scalia, a
master of the old grand theory school, and Justice O'Connor, leading figure of the
cobbler's court. This is especially evident in their contests over the interpretation of
the Religion Clauses.9 3 For those of you used to the heady days of Kennedyesque
idealism, my conclusions may well be disappointing. For practitioners, for the bench,
and for those who want to be able to understand and apply the law, the Rehnquist
Court, no matter how wrongheaded an individual opinion may be, provides the sort
of approach to cases which may well be a relief after a generation of high theory.
The cases this Term provide good examples of both the way in which a
cobbler's court functions at its best and the way in which a cobbler's court
approaches its role as constitutional arbiter. Tradition and the preservation of bright
lines rules were at the heart of Swidler.94 Baker's rejection of the use of the public
policy exception to resist application of the constitutional obligation of Full Faith and
96
Credit stands as another example.95 It was also present to a great extent in Breard.
A cobbler's court is deferential to government and devises practical rules to give
effect to this deference. Thus, in Finley, the majority, through Justice O'Connor,
used a dormant commerce clause analogy to support the government's imposition on
exclusionary rules to govern its patronage of the arts. 97 Where the government is
acting as patron rather than sovereign, different and more lax rules ought to apply.
Likewise, deference was at the heart of the Court's opinion in Sacramento v. Lewis98
which substantially frees police officers, and the governments which employ them,

92. For a taste of this see, e.g., Edward v. Sparer, The Role ofthe Welfare Client'sLawyer, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
361 (1965); Patricia A. Cain,LitigatingforLesbianand GayRights: A LegalHistory,79 VA. L. REv. 1551 (1993).
93. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, The IncarnateWord, that Old Rugged (Klan) Cross and the State: On the
Supreme Court'sOctober 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Absurdity as
Jurisprudence,31 TULSA LJ. 447 (1996).
94. Swidler v. Berlin, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998). In holding that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of
the client, a simple bright line rule, the Chief Justice took the high road, upholding a broad, simple and old fashioned
reading of the privilege. The ChiefJustice conceded, however, that the establishment of a bright line rule does not mean
it should stand for all time, but compelling proof of a generalized change in circumstances is needed to warrant such
an overturning. The dissent by Justice O'Connor was based on the other face of the cobbler's court-the desirability
of contextualization. Justice O'Connor would have converted the privilege effectively to a work product shield at the
death of the client. Such a shield could be pierced in a criminal proceeding (at least) where a balancing of the interest
in preservation ofthe confidence was outweighed by the interest in disclosure. The factors to be weighed would include
the interest in exonerating an innocent criminal defendant, the existence of a compelling law enforcement interest, and
the need to preserve incentive to communicate with one's lawyer.
95. Baker v. General Motors, Corp.,l 18 S. Ct 657 (1998). See text supra Part ll.B.
96. Breard v. Green, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998). See text supraPart l1.D.
97. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2177 (1998).
98. 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
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from liability for damages resulting from high speed chases. Within the ambit of its
authority, The Court also showed a willingness to confirm the power of the federal
government within the ambit of its authority over elections, 99 and telecommunications.'0 0
Most important, of course, is the continued emphasis on the context of the
decision. This is a court which tends to be leery of absolutes and to adhere closely
to the facts before it (at least as the Court construes the facts on which it wishes to
rely). Balancing and factor analysis is the order of the day. Justice Thomas's
embrace of the principle of proportionality in Excessive Fines Clause cases provides
a nice example.'
The fact that the Rehnquist Court can impose both bright lines rules and fact
base balancing tests in almost equal measure is less contradictory than it might
appear at first blush. It also serves as further evidence of the pragmatism, the
practitioner orientation, of this court. The answer lies in the nature of the litigants.
With respect to common law claims, or claims that do not involve the government as
principal or enforcer, then a highly contextualized balancing is often the rule. In these
cases, the peculiar facts before the courts and the interests of the litigants and the
court must be considered in arriving at a judgment of the case before a court. The
shortcomings of this approach are well known. 2 On the other hand, the Court will
take a different approach, one favoring bright line rules, where the government is an
active participant or in cases of statutory interpretation. In this context the court
seems to favor simple rules, which are easy to apply. 0 3 Oncale is a good case in
04
point.
IV. CONCLUSION

I have offered a different vision of the Rehnquist Court. Rather than consider
the preceding Term a disappointment, I consider it a great success. The Rehnquist
Court has finally found its stride. That law professors and headline mongers may be
disappointed is of little moment. The Rehnquist Court, in eschewing grand theory,
will be able to provide a significant contribution to jurisprudence. At last we will
have the evidence to argue intelligently about something other than grand theory:
Does a Supreme Court with a pragmatist or a theoretical bent do us the better
service? Only time will tell.

99. See Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464 (1998). See text supraPart II.C.
100. See AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1956 (1998). See text supraPart II.A.
101. United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998). Use of the principle of proportionality is common in
Europe and has been embraced as an important principle of constitutional adjudication in by the European Court of
Justice. See, e.g., NICHOLAS Etniou, THEPRINCIPLEOFPROPORTONALY INEUROPEAN LAW (1996).
102. Facts and circumstances adjudication can result in the creation of hollow rules consisting for the most part of
factor recipes. In abusive cases these factor recipes can be used as a screen through which a cynical court or a
manipulative counsel can reach a quite arbitrary decision. Moreover a highly contextualized approach can make
planning as difficult as the most obtuse statements of grand theory.
103. Of course, simple rules for complex problems can be bad medicine indeed. See Judith V. Royster,
Decontextualizing FederalIndian Law: The Supreme Court's1997-98 Term, 34 TUtLSA L.J. 329 (1999).
104. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). See supranote 91.
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